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Polish GDP Forecast Errors: A Tale of Ineffectiveness 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate gross domestic product (GDP) forecast errors of Polish 
professional forecasters based on the individual data from the Rzeczpospolita daily newspaper. 
This dataset contains predictions on forecasting competitions during the years 2013–2019 in 
Poland. Our analysis shows a lack of statistical effectiveness of these predictions. First, there 
is a systemic negative bias, which is especially strong during the years of conservative PiS 
government rule. Second, the forecasters failed to correctly predict the effects of major changes 
in fiscal policy. Third, there is evidence of strategic behaviors; for example, the forecasters 
tended to revise their prognosis too frequently and too excessively. We also document herding 
behavior, i.e., an alignment of the most extreme forecasts towards market consensus with time, 
and an overly strong reliance on forecasts from NBP inflation projections in cases of estimates 
for longer horizons. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate gross domestic product (GDP) forecast errors of 
Polish professional forecasters based on individual-level data from the Rzeczpospolita daily 
newspaper. The dataset contains predictions from forecasting competition and covers the years 
2013 to 2019. Based on statistical tests, we analyze the unbiasedness and effectiveness of the 
forecasts, as well as potential irregularities in the process of forecast revisions and consensus 
formation. 
We identified the following problems: 
1) The systematic underestimation of growth dynamics, particularly visible during the 
years 2016 to 2019, i.e. in the time of conservative PiS government rule. 
2) An inability to correctly forecast the effects of changes related to fiscal policy or 
structural reforms. Professional forecasters significantly underestimated the 
consequences of transition to new EU budget perspective, which resulted in contraction 
of investments growth. They probably also overestimated the effects of the introduction 
of a child benefit. These errors resulted in the forecast revisions of greatest magnitude 
and the biggest surprises in the analyzed sample. 
3) Excessive and overly frequent revisions of activity forecasts. A strong revision in 
quarter t tends to be reversed in the next quarter (t+1). Similar to the forecast errors, 
revisions are more likely to be positive rather than negative, especially after 2016. 
4) Evidence of strategic behaviors. Two forecasters tended to more strictly follow market 
consensus rather than produce controversial estimates. There was also a tendency to 
align the most extreme forecasts toward a market consensus; this is known as a herding 
behavior. Finally, any disagreement tends to be lower for the forecast with longer time 
horizon. This phenomenon suggests that forecasters are anchoring their expectations 
closely on the official projection of the central bank. 
Most of these problems are also reported in the G10 economies. However, we highlight two 
solutions which may limit the ineffectiveness of forecasts. First, in Poland, the market for 
economic forecasts is dominated by the commercial banks—90% of the forecasts are produced 
by representatives of those entities. Greater participation of public sector entities, i.e., the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, the National Bank of Poland (NBP), and the 
Polish Economic Institute, may be beneficial. Second, there are no systemic incentives for the 
  
academic sector to shape the public debate and regularly present economic forecasts. Modelling 
competitions organized by public sector entities may help to activate this group. 
This manuscript is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on GDP 
forecasting, describing irregularities visible especially in the G7 space. Section 3 delivers 
information about the dataset. Section 4 summarizes the methodology. Section 5 discusses the 
results of the estimation. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
The aim of this section is to present problems related to GDP growth forecasting 
reported previously in the academic literature. The prediction of a business cycle is probably 
one of the most sophisticated exercises done by economists and forecast errors are usually 
greater compared to other economic figures such as inflation (Lahiri & Sheng 2010; Loungani 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, researchers report persistent systematic biases which are especially 
visible in the forecasts with longer horizons (Ager et al., 2009). There is also strong evidence 
of failure to predict severe downturns (Loungani, 2001) or effects of structural changes, e.g., 
those related to fiscal policy (Blanchard & Leigh, 2013). 
The Polish economic debate is particularly driven by commercial economists 
representing the banking sector. The literature on the subject highlights a few significant 
problems related to such situations. 
First, the primary aim of such forecasters is not necessarily to minimize forecast errors, 
but rather to realize some other strategic objectives, for example, a greater presence in the 
media or triggering some policy actions (Pons‐Novell, 2003; Dovern & Weisser, 2011). This 
may result in two opposite phenomena: either strong and systematic deviations from the market 
consensus or self-censorship to avoid such discrepancies (i.e. herding behavior). Some authors 
(e.g., Ashiya, 2009) claim that forecasting may reflect the interests of the forecaster employer 
– for example representants of banking sectors in some periods may be more pessimistic than 
academics and the difference between estimates is statistically significant. 
Second, there is a widespread debate about irregularities visible in the revisions of the 
forecasts done by professionals. In a perfect world, the pattern of the revisions would be totally 
unpredictable and follow a random walk process (Nordhaus, 1987) however, this is not always 
the case. Several studies operating on monthly data show that forecasts are too rigid and too 
sluggish in incorporating incoming information (Lahiri & Sheng, 2010; Loungani et al., 2013; 
Capistrán & López-Moctezuma, 2014). There are also reports providing examples of strategic 
  
behaviors such as presenting overly optimistic or pessimistic estimates in order to acquire 
publicity (Ashiya, 2003). Finally, forecast revisions sometimes may be used to trigger 
significant policy actions or affect valuation in a financial instrument. However, these effects 
are rather more frequently seen in cases of publicly listed companies’ earnings announcements 
(e.g., Gleason & Lee, 2003; Kasznik & McNichols, 2002), rather than in relation to 
macroeconomic variables. 
Finally, several papers suggest there is an interaction between public and private sector 
forecasts. Behavioral economists suggest the effect of an anchoring bias (Campbell & Sharpe, 
2009); there is also evidence that the establishment of public forecasts may crowd out some 
efforts from the private sector (Tong, 2007). 
We propose three different statistical tests to identify if forecasts are unbiased and free 
of strategic behaviors. The detailed information will be presented in the methodology section. 
3. The Rzeczpospolita Forecasting Competition 
This section describes the dataset used in this study. The Rzeczpospolita competition 
was established in 2008 by NBP Governor Sławomir Skrzypek to promote better 
macroeconomic forecasting. The competition initially contained five categories of forecasts: 
gross domestic product (GDP), gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), unemployment rate, and the current account of the balance of payments. The NBP 
abandoned supporting the competition in 2015. After this event, Rzeczpospolia modified the 
forecast variables: private consumption and exchange rate forecasts were added; there was no 
further interest in forecasting the current account of the balance of payments or unemployment 
rate. 
The Rzeczpospolita survey is conducted quarterly. Polled analysts provide their 
estimates for the four quarters ahead. For example, at the end of September, analysts provide 
their estimates for the last quarter of the survey year and the first, second, and third quarters of 
the following year. At the time of the survey, information regarding GDP dynamics in the 
current quarter is still unavailable, and the analysts must base their estimates on monthly data 
(e.g., industrial production and construction output). In December, the window moves by one 
quarter, and at that time, the surveyed analysts are unaware of the GDP reading for the current 
quarter, and so on. 
The dataset used for this study consist of the individual forecasts covering the period 
from 2013 to 2019. We excluded the participants who posted their estimates irregularly or 
  
belonged to student associations (due to frequent rotations of the forecasters). Therefore, we 
were left with forecasts from 20 permanent contributors: 90% of them representing financial 
institutions and 10% representing academic institutions or think tanks. 
4. Methodology 
This section presents the methodology of our research. Our aim was to analyze the 
effectiveness of the GDP forecasts for the Polish economy based on two independent tests. We 
also verify whether there is evidence of strategic behaviors by the forecasters, following the 
approach of Pons‐Novell (2003). 
Below, we define the key variables used in the analysis: 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 denotes the annual dynamics of gross domestic product in the quarter t. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖  represents the 𝑖-th professional forecaster’s prognosis of gross domestic product 
in the quarter 𝑡, formulated h quarters prior to the reading. 𝑖 takes values from 1 to 𝑛, 
where 𝑛 denotes the number of forecasters. We will use the superscript 𝑓𝑖 every time a 
variable is related to the forecasts and not to a realized macroeconomic reading. 𝜇𝑖 stands for the individual error of the 𝑖-th professional forecaster, estimated using 
fixed effects model. 𝜃𝑡 denotes a time period effect. 𝜀𝑡 represents a random disturbance.  𝛽𝑥 are estimated parameters. 
4.1 Effectiveness of Forecasts: The First Statistical Test 
The first test of forecast effectiveness assumes that forecast errors should have no 
systematic bias. We follow an approach used previously by Ashiya (2003, 2009), Loungani 
(2001), and Lahiri and Sheng (2010). This test is also widely adopted in different contexts, for 
example, with fiscal forecasts (Artis & Marcellino, 2001; Brück & Tilman, 2005; Pina & 
Venes, 2011). 
We formulate the following equation using an ordinary linear regression with cross-
section and period fixed effects: 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡  (1) 
  
An effective forecast should meet the following criteria: 
(1) There are no systematic biases. Therefore, parameters 𝛽0 and 𝜇𝑖 should both be 
statistically insignificant for each forecaster. 
(2) Forecasts should correctly describe the final realization of GDP, except for some 
random disturbances related to 𝜃𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡. This implies that 𝛽1 = 1. 
(3) 𝜃𝑡 is a white noise series. 
We assume there is no multiplicative error in the forecast. Therefore, we simplify the 
first equation and provide the following model:  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖 −  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡  (2) 
Our aim is to test and verify the hypotheses presented in criteria (1) and (3). 
4.2 Effectiveness of Forecasts: The Second Statistical Test 
The second test follows the approach proposed by Nordhaus (1987). We attempt to 
verify whether the forecast revisions indeed follow a white noise process. Let us denote 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖 
as the magnitude of a forecast revision of GDP in the quarter 𝑡, prepared ℎ quarters prior to the 
reading. The indicators denote the difference between the most recent forecast at the time (𝑡 −ℎ) and the previous one, done in the period (𝑡 − ℎ − 1). The computation is given by the 
following formula: 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖 =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖 −  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ−1𝑓𝑖   (3) 
We attempt to estimate the following autoregressive model with fixed and period effects: 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡,ℎ−1𝑓𝑖  +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡  (4) 
Our aim is to verify the following hypotheses: 
(1) A past revision should not give information regarding the forecaster’s next decision. If 
the forecasts are effective, then parameter 𝛽1 is required to be statistically insignificant. 
(2) The cross-section fixed effect 𝜇𝑖 should be statistically insignificant. 
(3) 𝜃𝑡 should be a white noise series. 
We will also verify whether the magnitude of forecast revisions differ substantially between 
professionals. Some analysts may have a greater propensity to perform stronger revisions and 
  
to do so more frequently just to attract greater attention from the media. Therefore, we will 
compute the absolute values of the magnitudes of the forecast revisions and average them. 
4.3 Strategic Behaviors of Forecasters 
Finally, based on the approach of Pons‐Novell (2003), we attempt to verify whether 
there exists any evidence of strategic behaviors on the part of the forecasters. This methodology 
focuses on deviation of individual forecasts from the market consensus. We define the market 
consensus as the median of available forecasts. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ𝑓1 , 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ𝑓2 , … … , 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑛)  (5) 
Our aim is to analyze deviations from the market consensus, calculated by a simple subtraction. 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖 −  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖  (6) 
First, we analyze whether the magnitude of such deviations differs significantly 
between the forecasters. Forecasters can estimate the value of a market consensus prior to its 
publication as real-time information is available on the Bloomberg terminal; monthly estimates 
are also aggregated by a Consensus Economics poll. Therefore, some groups of analysts may 
have the temptation to self-censor their estimates and not deviate strongly from the median. 
To perform this exercise, we calculate the deviations of each forecaster’s projections 
from the consensus using equation 6. Then, we compute the absolute values of those deviations 
and average them separately for each forecaster. We perform a single t-test to verify whether 
the average deviation produced by a single forecaster is substantially different from those of 
other professionals. Forecasters strictly following the consensus should have substantially 
lower deviations, whereas economists lobbying for some policy action would produce greater 
deviations. 
Second, we attempt to identify evidence of herding behavior using the following model: 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,ℎ𝑓𝑖  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,ℎ−1𝑓𝑖   +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡  (7) 
Values of 𝛽1  lower than 1 suggest that forecasters are prone to correct their deviations and 
move closer to the consensus values as the forecast horizon shortens and estimates start to gain 
greater publicity. 
  
5. Estimation Results 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of our estimation. We find evidence 
of strategic behavior, and of both group and individual biases in the forecasts. 
5.1 First Test: Analysis of Forecast Errors 
The first test confirms the ineffectiveness of professional market forecasts. First, the 
constant parameter 𝛽0 is negative and statistically significant for all forecast horizons. 
Forecasts published in the examined window (2013-2019) tend to underestimate GDP growth 
dynamics by 0.4 to 0.6 percentage points (further pp). Detailed results are presented in Table 
1. 
Second, based on the statistical tests for redundant cross-section effects, we reject the 
null hypothesis that parameters corresponding to such effects are statistically insignificant 
(equal to zero). The problem of individual biases is quite visible in the parameter estimates. 
One survey respondent tended to systematically present much more pessimistic forecasts as 
compared to the average derived for other respondents; the discrepancy amounts to another 
0.5–0.6pp for the longer horizon (3Q–4Q). The respondent with the second largest negative 
bias provided forecasts that were lower by 0.2–0.3pp as compared to the average. The estimated 
cross-section of effects is presented in Table 2. 
Finally, the estimated time period effects are not representing a white noise process. 
There are two episodes confirming problems in forecasting structural changes and downturns. 
First, analysts overestimated the potential effect of introducing a child benefit program in 2015 
and early 2016. Second, they were incapable of predicting the duration of the slowdown related 
to contraction of investments during transition between EU budget perspectives. There was 
also a systematic shift in GDP forecasting errors for the years 2016 to 2019. During this time, 
forecasts were overly negative. This phenomenon may be related to a negative assessment of 
the economic policies proposed by the PiS government. The period effects are presented in 
Figure 1. 
5.2 Second Test: Analysis of Forecast Revisions  
The second test also confirms that forecasts are statistically ineffective. Before 
analyzing the model output, we should note that the magnitude of revision is different, 
depending on the time horizon and market participant. Detailed data is presented in Table 3. 
  
The strongest revisions occur in the quarters directly preceding the publication of data. 
The magnitude of revisions becomes lower, as forecasts horizon increases. There is a group of 
respondents (i.e. 8, 9, 12, and 16) who tend to revise forecasts more sharply compared to others. 
There is also a group that make significantly smaller revisions (respondents 14 and 20). 
The model confirms existences of autoregressive patterns visible in the data. There is 
statistically significant evidence that forecasters are prone to making excessively strong 
changes in their prognosis. A negative parameter of 𝛽1  (-0.3) indicates that a revision made in 
the previous quarter is usually corrected in the next round of polls. There is also evidence of 
systematic upward revisions: parameter 𝛽0 is positive in case of both forecast horizons. This 
evidence confirms the problem of systematic bias observed with the previous test. A detailed 
description of the model is available in Table 4. 
Estimates of cross-fixed effects and period effects are presented in Figures 2 and 3. 
Similar to the findings with the first test, there is evidence of persistent one-sided revisions 
during the time of PiS government rule (2017-2019). 
5.3 Third Test: Herding Behavior 
Finally, we also studied whether there is visible strategic behavior regarding an 
approach to market consensus. As with the previous test, we start from an analysis of 
descriptive data shown in Table 5. 
First, absolute values of deviation from market consensus and forecast disagreement 
are greater in the short term. Contrary to intuition and statistics, there is evidence of decaying 
disagreement with a longer forecast horizon. This problem may be caused by a willingness to 
follow central bank inflation projections (see e.g., Kotlowski, 2015). However, the NBP does 
not provide public access to quarterly forecasts; therefore, we are not capable of replicating 
this research. 
Second, the first two participants tended to more frequently formulate forecasts that do 
not deviate from the current market consensus (indexed as 1 and 2). Simultaneously, one of the 
pessimistic participants identified in the first test was also much more likely to deviate more 
strongly than the others from the market consensus in the 3Q–4Q horizon. 
The third model, specified in equation 7, confirms the existence of herding behavior. 
Parameter 𝛽1 is lower than 1 in each time horizon. Alignment toward consensus is most visible 
  
during a period of one to three quarters prior to publication. The model’s specification is 
presented in Table 6. 
6. Policy Conclusions 
The analysis of the Polish macroeconomic forecasts shows all the major imperfections 
identified in the subject literature, i.e., the existence of systematic biases and problems with 
correct forecasting of structural and fiscal changes. There is also strong evidence of strategic 
behaviors, seen in excessively strong forecast revisions and a willingness to align with a market 
consensus. 
The total elimination of the identified problems is probably impossible; however, it is 
worth considering ways to minimize the influence of dishonest behaviors. There is a 
discrepancy between the share of professional forecasters from the banking sector in Poland 
(90%) and G7 (around 50% in the eurozone according to Bowles et al., 2007). A greater 
diversification of forecasters’ backgrounds may be beneficial. 
A short-term solution may be provided by a more active engagement of public 
institutions in the debate in Poland. Presently, the government’s forecasts are provided twice 
per year (around April and October), and the central bank’s forecasts are provided three times 
per year (March, July, and November); more frequent projections and auditing of errors should 
foster the debate. As mentioned earlier, such decisions also have adverse effects, such as 
eliminating some private participants (Tong, 2007). 
The long-term problem is related to the low activity of academic and non-governmental 
institutions in these debates. Again, the public sector should provide incentives for greater 
participation in the public debates, for example, by using granting schemes. Some competition 
in developing forecasting models may also help to improve the forecasting market. 
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Table 1: Test 1 – Bias in Estimated Forecasts 
 
Forecast horizon 
1Q ahead 
forecast 
2Q ahead 
forecast 
3Q ahead 
forecast 
4Q ahead 
forecast 
Model  
Constant 
-0.46  
(0.01; 0.00***) 
-0.52  
(0.01; 0.00***) 
-0.59  
(0.01; 0.00***) 
-0.60  
(0.01; 0.00***) 
R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 
Observations 427 408 425 424 
Periods 22 21 22 22 
Cross-sections 20 20 20 20 
This table presents the parameter estimates of 𝛽0 for different forecast horizons. The model specification is 
presented in equation 2. Negative parameters for the model constant (the second row) denote that GDP 
forecasts were overly pessimistic in the analyzed period (2013-2019).  
 
Table 2: Test 1 – Estimated Cross-Section Effects 
 
Estimated fixed effects for 
different forecast horizons 
Standardized values (number of 
standard deviations from the mean) 
Respondent 
1Q 
ahead 
forecast 
2Q 
ahead 
forecast 
3Q 
ahead 
forecast 
4Q 
ahead 
forecast 
1Q 
ahead 
forecast 
2Q 
ahead 
forecast 
3Q 
ahead 
forecast 
4Q 
ahead 
forecast 
1 -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.15 0.62 0.41 0.33 
2 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.66 0.81 
3 -0.12 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06 -1.27 -0.77 -0.29 -0.30 
4 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -0.92 -0.41 -0.10 -0.45 
5 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.62 0.82 0.14 0.19 
6 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.57 0.14 -0.03 0.21 
7 -0.12 -0.14 -0.10 0.00 -1.28 -1.06 -0.56 0.00 
8 -0.11 -0.22 -0.25 -0.26 -1.25 -1.63 -1.39 -1.29 
9 0.02 0.09 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.69 1.35 1.30 
10 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.27 2.01 1.35 1.26 1.35 
11 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.32 0.36 0.17 -0.29 
12 0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.42 0.49 -0.21 -0.03 
13 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.13 0.15 0.12 -0.34 
14 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.32 -0.24 -0.06 -0.06 
15 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.47 0.32 0.19 
16 0.02 -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 0.22 -0.45 -0.65 -0.19 
17 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.19 1.01 0.43 0.71 0.96 
18 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.42 -0.17 0.19 -0.24 
19 -0.17 -0.36 -0.58 -0.64 -1.84 -2.67 -3.19 -3.21 
20 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.21 1.86 1.70 1.14 1.06 
 
Average 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Std. Dev. 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.20     
This table presents the parameter estimates of 𝜇𝑖 for different forecast horizons (columns 2-5). Columns 6-9 
show standardized values. The model specification is presented in equation 2. Respondents 8 and 19 
systematically present more negative forecasts compared to other professionals; given that the 𝛽0 values are 
negative (Table 1), they are more biased than their competitors. Forecasters 10 and 20 are less biased. 
 
  
  
 
 
Table 3: Test 2 – Magnitude of Revision (pp) 
 
Magnitude of revisions (absolute 
value) 
Standardized values (Number of 
standard deviations from the mean) 
Respondent 3Q before publication 
2Q before 
publication 
1Q before 
publication 
3Q before 
publication 
2Q before 
publication 
1Q before 
publication 
1 0.21 0.33 0.36 -1.11 0.06 0.17 
2 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.66 -0.32 -1.18 
3 0.23 0.26 0.45 -0.67 -0.78 1.30 
4 0.26 0.38 0.34 -0.10 0.59 -0.12 
5 0.26 0.34 0.35 -0.18 0.17 -0.03 
6 0.27 0.17 0.30 0.17 -1.71 -0.69 
7 0.25 0.25 0.23 -0.32 -0.91 -1.63 
8 0.28 0.48 0.47 0.40 1.68 1.62 
9 0.31 0.41 0.48 0.97 0.94 1.70 
10 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.38 -0.32 -0.26 
11 0.24 0.26 0.31 -0.55 -0.80 -0.55 
12 0.28 0.51 0.41 0.36 2.02 0.74 
13 0.22 0.30 0.34 -0.98 -0.32 -0.16 
14 0.18 0.23 0.26 -1.85 -1.04 -1.21 
15 0.31 0.36 0.38 1.03 0.31 0.44 
16 0.35 0.47 0.38 1.86 1.57 0.44 
17 0.32 0.28 0.37 1.21 -0.56 0.32 
18 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.84 -0.22 -0.08 
19 0.27 0.41 0.44 0.08 0.93 1.17 
20 0.16 0.21 0.20 -2.22 -1.28 -1.99 
 
Average 0.26 0.33 0.35    
Std. Dev. 0.05 0.09 0.08    
This table presents the absolute values of forecast revisions (columns 2-4). Columns 5-8 show standardized 
values. The magnitude of the revisions was calculated with the formula presented in equation 3. Respondents 
8,9,12, and 16 tended to make bigger revisions compared to the others; respondents 14 and 20 made smaller 
revisions. 
 
Table 4: Test 2 – Autoregressive Models of Forecast Revisions 
 
Horizon 
1Q ahead revision 2Q ahead revision 
Model 
Constant 
0.11 
(0.01; 0.00***) 
0.05 
(0.01; 0.00***) 
Previous 
Revision 
-0.32 
(0.05; 0.00***) 
-0.30 
(0.06; 0.00***) 
R-squared 0.63 0.58 
Observations 438 438 
Periods 23 23 
Cross-sections 20 20 
This table presents the parameter estimates of 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 for different forecast horizons. The model specification 
is presented in equation 4. Positive values of the model constant 𝛽0 (the second row) confirm that the 
forecasters were overly pessimistic—the number of positive revisions is greater than the number of negative 
ones. Negative values of the model constant 𝛽0 after the previous revision (the third row) imply that the 
forecasters are prone to making overly strong revisions; the changes are often reversed in the next quarter. 
 
 
  
 
Table 5: Test 3 – Average of Absolute Deviations from the Market Consensus 
 
Average deviation from market 
consensus (absolute value) 
Standardized values (number of 
standard deviations from the mean) 
Respondent 
1Q 
ahead 
forecast 
2Q 
ahead 
forecast 
3Q 
ahead 
forecast 
4Q 
ahead 
forecast 
1Q 
ahead 
forecast 
2Q 
ahead 
forecast 
3Q 
ahead 
forecast 
4Q 
ahead 
forecast 
1 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 -2.53 -2.72 -2.36 -2.12 
2 0.37 0.41 0.29 0.28 -1.58 -1.12 -1.36 -1.06 
3 0.56 0.43 0.33 0.34 -0.72 -1.01 -1.04 -0.57 
4 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.39 -0.92 -0.79 0.03 -0.12 
5 0.52 0.40 0.40 0.34 -0.90 -1.18 -0.46 -0.53 
6 0.58 0.51 0.45 0.42 -0.61 -0.50 -0.10 0.15 
7 0.74 0.71 0.49 0.34 0.10 0.75 0.28 -0.53 
8 0.85 0.89 0.64 0.46 0.62 1.86 1.43 0.52 
9 0.79 0.68 0.45 0.44 0.33 0.59 -0.07 0.36 
10 0.75 0.60 0.47 0.43 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.29 
11 0.86 0.74 0.58 0.52 0.66 0.91 0.95 1.03 
12 0.73 0.62 0.37 0.34 0.05 0.17 -0.71 -0.54 
13 0.84 0.61 0.44 0.53 0.57 0.13 -0.15 1.10 
14 0.87 0.59 0.43 0.37 0.71 0.03 -0.26 -0.28 
15 1.07 0.66 0.46 0.35 1.61 0.47 -0.04 -0.40 
16 0.98 0.67 0.62 0.42 1.22 0.51 1.28 0.19 
17 0.94 0.69 0.56 0.49 1.04 0.63 0.79 0.77 
18 0.86 0.74 0.43 0.35 0.67 0.93 -0.21 -0.43 
19 0.64 0.59 0.72 0.72 -0.34 0.00 2.07 2.81 
20 0.69 0.63 0.44 0.33 -0.12 0.26 -0.17 -0.66 
 
Average 0.71 0.59 0.46 0.40     
Std. Dev. 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.11     
This table presents the absolute values of forecast deviations from the market consensus (columns 2-5). 
Columns 6-9 show standardized values. Deviations were calculated with the formulae presented in equations 
5 and 6. Respondents 1 and 2 tended to strictly follow the consensus. This may be a result of strategic behavior 
rather than use of independent models. 
 
  
  
 
Table 6: Test 3 – Deviation from Market Consensus  
 
Forecast horizon 
1Q ahead 
forecast 
2Q ahead 
forecast 
3Q ahead 
forecast 
4Q ahead 
forecast 
Model 
Constant 
0.48 
(0.05, 0.00***) 
0.31 
(0.04, 0.00***) 
0.21 
(0.03, 0.00***) 
0.19 
(0.03, 0.00***) 
Deviation in the 
previous quarter 
0.49 
(0.07, 0.00***) 
0.70 
(0.11,0.00***) 
0.55 
(0.10,0.00***)  
Deviation of the 
previous forecast    
0.19 
(0.07,0.01***) 
R-squared 0.40 0.44 0.66 0.62 
Observations 286 317 381 381 
Periods 22 23 25 25 
Cross-sections 20 20 20 20 
This table presents the parameter estimates of 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 for different forecast horizons. The model specification 
is presented in equation 7. Values of 𝛽1 lower than 1 (rows 3 and 4) imply that the forecasters are self-censoring 
to avoid large deviations from the market consensus (herding behavior).  
 
  
  
Figure 1: Test 1 – Visualization of Period Effects 
 
This figure presents the estimated values of 𝜃𝑡 for different forecast horizons. The model specification is 
presented in equation 2. The lag relationships were used to group the forecasts corresponding to the same 
poll release. A negative systematic bias persists in the years 2016-2019, during PiS government rule.  
 
Figure 2: Test 2 – Visualization of Period Effects 
 
This figure presents the estimated values of 𝜃𝑡 for different forecast horizons. The model specification is 
presented in equation 4. The lag relationships were used to group the forecasts corresponding to the same poll 
release. This series is not an example of a white noise process—we see some persistence of one-sided revision 
(e.g., during 2017-2019).  
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Figure 3: Test 2 – Magnitude of Revisions 
This figure presents the estimated values of 𝜇𝑖 for different forecast horizons. The model specification is 
presented in equation 4. The estimates confirm that some forecasters tend to make overly strong revisions. 
For greater details, see also Table 3. 
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